Hurricane Katrina created an unprecedented need for sheltering and temporary housing across a four-state area along the Gulf Coast. This article reviews the disaster literature with respect to sheltering and temporary housing and contrasts how these needs actually developed with respect to both the preimpact and postimpact evacuation situations. The article also investigates the ways that intergovernmental planning failed to anticipate the need for shelter/housing solutions or to implement effective measures to put those plans into operation.
H
urricane Katrina resulted in the largest relocation of citizens within the United States since the Dust Bowl of the 1930s. However, the Dust Bowl migration of 300,000 to 400,000 people from the southern plains states to California took place over several years, in comparison to an estimated 1.2 million people who left their homes and communities within hours or days before Hurricane Katrina's landfall along the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005 (Gregory 1989 ). Due to the subsequent flooding of New Orleans, the 100,000 to 120,000 residents who remained in the city were rapidly transformed into a second wave of evacuees, greatly intensifying the need for shelter and housing.
This article assesses the adequateness of governmental efforts to provide shelter and housing for thousands of evacuees displaced by Hurricane Katrina. Although this process is ongoing, the data used in this analysis primarily reflect actions taken during the warning and early response periods.
1 Because the largest group of evacuees were from the New Orleans area and because they constituted the largest number of those in "official" shelters (i.e., those facilities that were preidentified and/or run by the Ameri-can Red Cross), we will describe the federal planning processes of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the states of Louisiana and Texas for evacuation, sheltering, and temporary housing. Using these planning documents as "ideal types" (to use Weber's concept) to characterize the way housing issues were expected to be resolved, we will then contrast those expectations with the actions that were taken. In other words, we will use evacuation and sheltering/housing processes as a context for explaining how the failure of an unintegrated emergency management system exacerbated threats to the safety, health, welfare, and emotional well-being of evacuees. First, however, we provide an overview of the federal government's plans for responding to large-scale disasters regarding sheltering and temporary housing needs of New Orleans's residents in the hours and weeks following the hurricane.
Emergent Sheltering and Housing Needs: An Overview
On Saturday, August 27, 2005, Max Mayfield, director of the National Hurricane Center, contacted Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin to express his extreme concern about the immanent threat posed by Hurricane Katrina (Lush 2005) . New Orleans is a city below sea level and bordered on three sides by the Gulf of Mexico, the Mississippi River, and Lake Pontchartrain, making it vulnerable to flooding (Eisler and Watson 2005 vehicles" (Office of Emergency Preparedness 2005, 13). Although the state's plan contains a clause for the use of school and municipal buses by volunteer agencies, nowhere in the plan is it specified who is responsible for the logistic coordination of the volunteer agencies for the provision of evacuation transportation (Office of Emergency Preparedness 2005).
On August 28, Mayor Nagin ordered the first mandatory evacuation in the history of the city of New Orleans (Dunne 2005; Russell 2005) . Of the more than 460,000 residents of New Orleans, it was estimated that between 100,000 and 120,000 residents did not evacuate prior to Hurricane Katrina for several reasons: they did not have access to personal transportation, they had health conditions that made mobility difficult, they had jobs that required them to remain, or they did not believe the risk from the hurricane was high (Laska 2004; Renne 2005 ; U.S. Census Bureau 2005) .
As Hurricane Katrina quickly escalated to a Category 5 storm on August 28, authorities established the Louisiana Superdome as the "refuge of last resort" for residents unable to evacuate New Orleans (Russell 2005) . According to the state of Louisiana's Emergency Operations Plan, a last-resort refuge is a place for persons to be protected from the high winds and heavy rains from the storm. Unlike a shelter, there may be little or no water or food and possibly no utilities. Thus, a last resort refuge is intended to provide best available survival protection for the duration of the hurricane only. (Office of Emergency Preparedness 2005, 29) Therefore, according to the state's plan, the Superdome was intended to be used as a refuge of last resort and not necessarily as a mass shelter. Even though the Superdome was considered a refuge of last resort, the Louisiana National Guard delivered three truckloads of ready-to-eat meals and water prior to Katrina's landfall, enough to supply fifteen thousand people for three days (Russell 2005) .
For several hours on August 28, buses in New Orleans were deployed to assist transporting nonevacuees (who primarily consisted of residents of the city who had no transportation out of the area and tourists who were stranded when the airport closed) to the Superdome. Despite the fact that the Emergency Operations Plan, developed by the Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force under the auspices of the state's Office of Emergency Planning, called for New Orleans to use several hundred school buses for such an evacuation, these vehicles were not deployed because the city was unable to find drivers (DeBose 2005) . By the time Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, an estimated nine thousand residents sought refuge in the Superdome, while an additional three thousand people were housed in forty-five previously identified shelters opened by the American Red Cross (Russell 2005) . At this point, it appeared that the Superdome and the much smaller shelters were effectively serving the residents of New Orleans as emergency shelters.
On August 30, however, the levee along the Seventeenth Street Canal was breached, resulting in significant flooding and the relocation of approximately eighteen thousand additional residents to the Superdome and approximately twenty thousand evacuees to the New Orleans Convention Center. Unlike the Superdome, the Convention Center had not been designated a refuge of last resort, but it became a major emergency shelter for displaced residents (Russell 2005) . As conditions deteriorated inside the Superdome and the New Orleans Convention Center and as the numbers of evacuees continued to swell to forty-six thousand between the two sites, Governor Blanco ordered the entire city of New Orleans to be evacuated. Although the media widely reported the deteriorating conditions at both the Superdome and the Convention Center, both FEMA Director Michael Brown and DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff claimed to have no knowledge that the Convention Center was being used as a shelter or that conditions within both facilities were appalling and continuing to worsen until September 1 (O'Brien 2005) .
As the orders to relocate evacuees from the Superdome and Convention Center were being given, it was announced that Reliant Park in Houston, Texas, would serve as a site for evacuees from New Orleans (Harris County Joint Information Center 2005c). Reliant Park is a sprawling four-site property located in downtown Houston, consisting of Reliant Stadium (which was not used for evacuees), the Reliant Astrodome, Reliant Arena, and Reliant Center, each of which became large shelters. Additionally, the George R. Brown Convention Center, located approximately six miles from Reliant Park, was also used for evacuees from Louisiana (Barnshaw 2005) . The effort to shelter evacuees in Houston was a joint effort coordinated by Houston Mayor William White and Harris County Judge Robert Eckels.
By September 1, this news prompted a convergence at the Superdome where as many as 30,000 to 60,000 people gathered, believing this to be the best place to evacuate from New Orleans and other areas of southeast Louisiana (O'Brien 2005) . Later that day, the first busload of evacuees arrived at the Astrodome and Reliant Park in a school bus commandeered by a private citizen (Bryant and Garza 2005) . Although the complete evacuation of New Orleans was only expected to last two days, the evacuation took longer than anticipated due to damaged infrastructure and overwhelming throngs of victims seeking exodus from the chaotic scene. By September 2, officials stated that the Reliant Astrodome was holding approximately 15,000 evacuees, while Reliant Arena was sheltering an additional 3,000; Reliant Center would be opened within days and was capable of housing up to 11,000 additional evacuees (Harris County Joint Information Center 2005a). Although comprehensive statistics prior to this period are piecemeal, the four emergency shelters in Texas (Reliant Astrodome, Reliant Arena, Reliant Center, George R. Brown Convention Center) had a peak occupancy of 27,100 evacuees on September 4 and were closed at 7:00 p.m. CDT on September 20, due to the approach of Hurricane Rita (Harris County Joint Information Center 2005b).
Later on September 2, Texas Governor Rick Perry announced an emergency plan that created additional space for 50,000 evacuees in San Antonio and Dallas (Harris County Joint Information Center 2005d). On September 3, a convoy of fifty buses began transporting additional evacuees from Houston to Dallas at such a rate that it was estimated that there were approximately 130,000 evacuees in shelters in Texas, in addition to the estimated 90,000 evacuees already in hotels and private homes in the state (CBS News 2005) . By Labor Day, September 6, the date on which the Superdome was completely evacuated, Texas had an estimated 250,000 evacuees, and the state of Texas began requesting further assistance from other states for the remaining 40,000 to 50,000 evacuees from the Gulf Coast region (FEMA 2005b) . It is estimated that Arkansas took the majority of the overlap for a total net increase of approximately 100,000 evacuees in various shelters and parks throughout the state, while Oklahoma received at least an additional 20,000 evacuees (FEMA 2005b) .
Vertical evacuation, taking shelter from an imminent danger in the upper floors of multistory buildings, has been discussed as an option for people who cannot leave a [threatened] location.
Two weeks after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, twenty-five states were involved in the provision of sheltering for evacuees; and by September 30, evacuees were registered in every state and almost half of the ZIP codes in the United States. Three-quarters of evacuees were staying within 250 miles of their preimpact homes; but tens of thousands were more than one thousand miles away from New Orleans.
Evacuation Planning
Evacuation planning is one of the primary tools that emergency managers use to anticipate removing people from harm's way when a disaster is imminent. Historically, this concept has been used in conjunction with warnings of natural disasters, especially floods, severe storms, hurricanes, and, more recently, tornado events. Due to recent advances in scientific modeling and the development of new technologies, warnings can now be released earlier, providing residents of the potentially effected areas with slightly longer lead times to engage in protective actions.
Recently, two other protective responses to warnings have been proposed as an alternative to horizontal evacuation: vertical evacuation and sheltering-in-place. Vertical evacuation, taking shelter from an imminent danger in the upper floors of multistory buildings, has been discussed as an option for people who cannot leave a location that may become inundated by floodwaters or threatened by hurricane-force winds. The notion is that engineered, high-rise structures can provide adequate short-term protection from these hazards. Vertical evacuation can be thought of as providing a refuge of last resort or as a planned supplement to horizontal evacuation when transportation routes are inadequate for mass egress (Ruch et al. 1991) . During the impact of Hurricane Katrina, many tourists were reported to have vertically evacuated to high-rise hotels in New Orleans because their flights had been cancelled and they did not have access to transport out of the city.
Sheltering-in-place is the strategy more often used in instantaneous onset dangers such as tornadoes, hazardous materials incidents, and limited radiological releases. In these instances, people are advised to stay where they are and take precautions to protect themselves by using safe spaces in their residences or businesses and limiting exposure to the hazard. The notion of sheltering-in-place assumes that, if rescue is necessary, people will be moved to safety rather quickly and not left exposed to the elements for days. Given the rapid-onset flooding in New Orleans caused by collapses of the levee along Lake Ponchatrain as well as other sites, sheltering-in-place may have become a death sentence for those who stayed, due to drowning, lack of food and water, or rooftop exposure. Even in midNovember 2005, the death toll from the flooding continues to rise as workers are more thoroughly inspecting homes that had been inundated, finding bodies of people in the attics of their homes where they had retreated from the flood waters, only to be unable to make their way to rooftops.
[In New Orleans,] one in every six people did not have a vehicle available for personal use.
Very little research has actually investigated internal evacuation, that is, the transportation of people to local emergency shelters, either to vertical evacuation facilities or to refuges for sheltering-in-place. To date, planning guidance with respect to internal evacuation focuses almost solely on the identification of structurally sound facilities located in low-risk areas of a community that can be used to provide emergency shelter for short periods of time (usually less than twenty-four hours) to ride out the storm in relative safety. Virtually no planning guidance is available to assist emergency managers in developing transportation strategies for internal evacuation, including how to communicate this information to the public in a timely fashion. Without this type of planning, however, the transportation, medical, social service, and emergency sheltering needs of evacuees cannot be adequately assessed, leaving the most vulnerable evacuees facing severe deprivation, worsening physical and health conditions, potential violence, and even death.
As noted previously, some planning was conducted by the state in concert with the southeast parishes and endorsed by the city of New Orleans, with respect to evacuating people from New Orleans, where one in every six people did not have a vehicle available for personal use. These plans failed, however, in part due to the lack of bus drivers, resulting in people either walking to refuges of last resort or remaining in their own dwellings during the storm and subsequent flood.
If the levees had not failed, this level of planning would probably have been seen as somewhat "successful," despite the lack of transportation and problems with getting supplies to the victims. After all, few casualties have been associated directly with wind or storm surge hazards, and the prehurricane evacuation of approximately 80 percent of the population of New Orleans was remarkable. Once the flooding began, however, the weaknesses of the state and local hurricane plan became apparent.
Planning for Sheltering and Temporary Housing
In the disaster literature, the provision of shelter and housing for victims falls along a continuum from predisaster emergency sheltering to permanent rehousing (Phillips 1992 (Phillips , 1993 Quarantelli 1982 Quarantelli , 1991 Quarantelli , 1995 . The four categories that are usually arrayed along this continuum include emergency shelters, temporary shelters, temporary housing, and permanent (or replacement) housing.
Emergency shelters are intended to provide structurally sound havens for very short periods of less than twenty-four hours during and following the disaster. Refuges of last resort are included in this category. Because these facilities are expected to be used for such a brief time, they are often uncomfortable spaces with few amenities and are sparsely provisioned.
Temporary shelters provide facilities for individuals and families whose homes are without utilities or were damaged to the extent that they are no longer habitable. These temporary living arrangements usually exist for several days to several weeks, depending on how long it takes to find more normal living arrangements. These facilities have adequate sanitation facilities, sometimes food storage and preparation capabilities, and can provide sleeping spaces for a few hundred people at a time. Sometimes these are indoor facilities (school gymnasiums or auditoriums) or tent cities (if the weather is mild enough). These facilities are primarily the responsibility of local governments to identify and, in conjunction with the Red Cross, to operate. The bulk of the research on sheltering has focused on these facilities in the past. There is a consensus among researchers that temporary shelters have been greatly underused, with people staying only for a few days until alternative arrangements could be made. There have been remarkably few instances of temporary shelters failing to satisfy needs of local victims.
Temporary housing is an intermediate stage when victims still cannot return to their damaged homes but need to find interim housing, which allows them to return to their normal functions and tasks. These housing options are usually apartments or rental homes that evacuees use for several weeks to several years until vic-tims can return to their original repaired or totally rebuilt homes. Victims who were renters before the disaster may skip this step entirely if appropriate rental units are available to them on a permanent basis. When rental properties are not available in the disaster-impacted area, FEMA has frequently made mobile homes available as temporary housing options, either situating a trailer on a property owner's lot (seen as more desirable by more property owners) or in mobile home parks that are in the vicinity of the damaged neighborhoods (seen as less desirable from a community planning perspective, but acceptable since local residents can remain in or near the community).
Permanent (or replacement) housing is necessary when victims will never be able to return to their original homes, either because (1) the owners of the victims' rental properties have decided not to rebuild or to replace the rentals with highercost dwellings or (2) the victims cannot afford to rebuild their homes. If the vacancy rate in the disaster-affected area is low (as it is in southeastern Louisiana due to widespread damage to the existing housing stock), disaster victims may need to relocate to other cities, counties/parishes, or states.
The unique social impacts created by Hurricane Katrina have created a fifth category of sheltering/housing that has not been considered previously-long-term sheltering. Since the city of New Orleans was totally evacuated and residents of that city were bused or flown to temporary shelters in several states without knowing when, or if, they will be able to return, these nonlocal reception centers will have to provide long-term sheltering services for the hurricane/flood victims. It is currently unknown how many of those residents who horizontally evacuated before the hurricane may also be in need of long-term sheltering; however, it should be assumed that most of them have lost their homes and their jobs, making them delayed victims of the hurricane.
Dynamic and fluid sheltering needs.
In his review of sheltering and housing needs following disasters, Quarantelli (1982) cautioned that victims do not necessarily progress in a linear fashion through the four sheltering/housing phases discussed above; nor do physical facilities provide only one type of sheltering. Rather, the catastrophic aftermath of Hurricane Katrina reveals the fluid and dynamic sheltering process rendering the four-phase conceptualization somewhat arbitrary along at least three lines. First, in Hurricane Katrina, physical structures provided multiple functions and types of sheltering. The Superdome, for example, served as a refuge of last resort prior to Katrina's landfall, then as an emergency shelter once flooding occurred in New Orleans, and finally as an unplanned temporary shelter for several days because of the delayed postimpact evacuation. Similarly, hotels also underwent a transformation of function. As occupancy increased over time, some hotels-both in and outside the impact area-went from providing emergency shelter to being used as short-term temporary housing, often with financial assistance from FEMA or the American Red Cross. This situation was compounded by Hurricane Rita, which threatened many of the evacuees from Katrina in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas. Second, in contrast to previous disasters, Hurricane Katrina provided significant deviation from traditional conceptualizations of temporary sheltering in at least two ways. Due to the catastrophic nature of Katrina and the prolonged inoperability of key geographic locations such as New Orleans, Katrina resulted in an extended dislocation of residents from the impacted area. Unprecedented in previous disasters, Katrina marked the first time evacuees were sent to shelters in other states such as Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and as far away as states on the Pacific Coast. Also unique to Katrina was the extended duration of evacuation. In many previous disasters, the upward limits of evacuees' stays in temporary shelters may be days or a couple of weeks at most; but Katrina-induced flooding caused thousands of evacuees to remain in shelters for weeks or months.
Third, interviews and information gathered from evacuees reveals that transitions were nonsequential for individuals between sheltering stages. While thousands of evacuees transitioned from emergency sheltering to temporary sheltering and then to temporary housing, some transitioned from emergency sheltering to temporary housing, while others transitioned from temporary sheltering and back to emergency sheltering. These instances are indicative of the dynamic and fluid sheltering needs that authorities had to deal with in the complex environment following the hurricane. In some interviews, evacuees reported moving from emergency sheltering to temporary sheltering in mass care facilities, then to hotels, and then back again to mass care facilities as financial resources ran out. In light of recent policy decisions to end the hotel and housing program, likely thousands more will find themselves in a similar transitional stage. This is not to say that the four-phase typology developed by Quarantelli (1982) should be considered ineffective or ahistorical. It merely highlights emergent areas in sheltering and housing not previously observed and draws attention to the fact that the typology is not mutually exclusive or collectively exhaustive, and as such, further refinement is necessary.
Expectations of Governmental Actions and Resources
We have presented some of the sheltering and housing problems that took place following Hurricane Katrina. Sheltering and housing were, and remain, the principal problem facing all levels of government. What governmental plans were in existence to deal with these short-term problems? Understanding intergovernmental relations is useful for providing a context for the political structure of decisions and understanding how preexisting arrangements facilitate or exacerbate relief provisions and assistance to citizens during a disaster occasion.
The federal context. As a reaction to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the DHS developed a new federal plan for responding to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other large-scale emergencies. In December 2004, the National Response Plan (NRP) became effective and was intended to be fully implemented within four months (DHS 2004, ix) . The NRP provided the allocation of responsibilities for specific disaster-related tasks across all federal agencies and the American Red Cross (the only nonfederal organization specifically identified as a "primary agency" in the plan). Fifteen tasks, referred to as Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), identify a coordinating agency, a primary agency, and support agencies. For example, ESF no. 6-mass care, housing, and human services-is under the coordination of DHS/FEMA, with DHS/FEMA and the American Red Cross being the primary agencies responsible for carrying out these functions. An additional fifteen federal agencies and two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are identified as providing support. With respect to housing, the primary responsibility is "the provision of short-and long-term housing needs of victims" (DHS 2004, EFS no. 6-1) . In general, the NRP is intended to provide horizontal coordination among federal agencies, specifying their roles in postdisaster situations.
According to the NRP, a coordinated federal response can be implemented in two ways. The first requires a request from a state's governor if he or she believes that the resources available within the state will be or have been overwhelmed and external resources are needed to limit human suffering. This request for a Presidential Disaster Declaration can be made before the disaster strikes. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, whose speed and force was monitored for days before it made landfall, governors along the Gulf Coast requested such a declaration, knowing the destructive capabilities of the storm. Florida received a declaration on August 28, while the states of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi received declarations on August 29. The second way for federal assistance to be made available to states is by the secretary of the DHS declaring the storm an incident of national significance (INS). Secretary Chertoff formally declared Katrina an INS on August 30, the first time such a designation has been used. Chertoff could have taken this action without receiving requests from the governors anytime before the event, however, but failed to do so despite the computerized models FEMA ran in an exercise a year earlier ("Hurricane Pam") that projected the need for federal resources, especially if the levees failed.
The success of the NRP is predicated on the implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) at all governmental levels (DHS 2004, 1) . NIMS provides intergovernmental structure that allows for vertical coordination, resource categorization, a common command structure (the Incident Command System), and the development of communication strategies for identifying and providing resources. NIMS was issued by DHS in March 2004, and all federal agencies were expected to develop a plan for training their personnel by December 2004. By 2007, states would be required to adopt the Incident Command System, begin training their personnel in NIMS concepts, and develop mutual aid agreements. As of May 2005, no date had been set for local government compliance. Clearly, the implementation of the NRP and NIMS was expected to facilitate intergovernmental information gathering and resource provision during major disaster situations.
Although FEMA and the DHS have been engaged in catastrophe planning since 2001, none of the planning exercises have ever seriously addressed the need for long-term sheltering in distant locations, nor has any significant planning guidance on the subject been found (see Clarke [1999] for a critique of catastrophic planning efforts).
However, sheltering and temporary housing were the major problems that had to be addressed by response agencies across all governmental levels due to the evacuation of New Orleans residents. Not only did other Louisiana communities and parishes take in hurricane and flood victims, but other states also established major reception centers for victims, providing temporary shelters as well as temporary housing. The magnitude of this problem overwhelmed all intrastate capabilities to assist victims and also began to strain the resources of nearby states.
This multistate sheltering and relocation of disaster victims had never before been confronted. However, FEMA drew on an initiative that was developed in conjunction with the state of Florida following the 2004 hurricane season when four major hurricanes (Charlie, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne) crisscrossed the state, leaving thousands of families needing shelter and temporary housing. Drawing on this single-state experience, FEMA established a Housing Area Command (HAC) to expedite the process of developing emergency shelters for those displaced by Hurricane Katrina. The HAC is the "focal point for coordinating the federal response and for maximizing innovation and assistance from donors and businesses" during disaster response (FEMA 2005a). Hurricane Katrina provided the first implementation of the HAC to meet emergency shelter needs after a disaster. The HAC was composed of FEMA representatives, other federal agencies identified in ESF no. 6 (HUD and the Corps of Engineers particularly), the American Red Cross, and members of the private sector. Those corporations represented in the HAC included the Shaw Group Inc., Fluor Group, Bechtel National Inc., CH2M Hill and DewBerry Inc. (FEMA 2005a) . Some of these private sector companies received emergency services contracts from FEMA in conjunction with readying shelters.
Hurricane Katrina also provided FEMA with an opportunity to establish the Joint Housing Solution Center (JHSC), a loosely organized, coordinating group to work with local communities to assess their needs for temporary shelters and temporary housing. A plan to establish a JHSC was completed in July 2005, barely a month before Katrina hit. The JHSC is expected to coordinate resources addressing needs in six different areas: bricks and mortar (home design and construction), community services, disaster and recovery policy, housing finance and insurance, community planning, and infrastructure. Although the most pressing concern the JHSC has addressed to date is the need for temporary housing, its major mission is to "facilitate the coordination of re-housing ideas, innovations, strategies, solutions, and resources from all levels of government and all sectors of the society under one roof" (FEMA 2005c) . The ultimate goal of the JHSC, then, is to provide resources and housing options with the intent to foster long-term community recovery and redevelopment, not just short-term sheltering and temporary hous-ing. As the federal government's link to local communities, the JHSC is intended to build capacity and develop policy at a regional level, while providing resources to assist them in their rebuilding and planning efforts.
The JHSC is the information-gathering and operational arm of the HAC. To perform this function, several multidisciplinary "strike teams" were formed. These six-to twelve-person teams included planners, architects, engineers, and construction managers who worked with local government representatives and community members to identify sheltering and, more recently, temporary housing needs and to begin to implement solutions.
While these mechanisms sound promising, they did not work effectively for several reasons: they were basically new and untested; they were dealing with four different states at the same time; local officials had no knowledge of, experience with, or role in these types of mechanisms; the HAC made policy in Washington, while the JHSC had to deal with problems in the region; and there was no linkage between the JHSC and FEMA's Individual Assistance program or the Red Cross, which provide money for temporary housing and small home repairs.
The Louisiana context. In attempting to understand why an integrated emergency management system failed to exist before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina, it is important to understand the sociopolitical context and structure of intergovernmental politics in New Orleans, the surrounding parishes, the state of Louisiana, and the U.S. government.
Particularly salient in the case of Hurricane Katrina are the intergovernmental relations between Mayor Nagin, Governor Blanco, and FEMA Director Michael Brown. Before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina, each of these major political figures had varying expectations of the other actors' roles in the response, which on several occasions created ambiguity, confusion, and a misappropriation or underutilization of desperately needed resources. Therefore, it may be illustrative to understand the context and political structure under which these decisions were made and how the actors came to make the decisions they did.
Although the social problems of widespread poverty, racial segregation, underperforming schools, and criminal activity have existed in most large cities such as New Orleans for a considerable time, it was not until Hurricane Katrina disrupted the entire urban system that these structural problems created conditions that drew widespread national media attention. Similarly, the unique tradition of consolidated power in parish presidents, coupled with the historically volatile nature of Louisiana state politics, represents established political conditions that were not sufficiently newsworthy prior to Katrina but that would serve as barriers for effective resource allocation in the impact and postimpact periods. Traditional antagonisms within the Louisiana political milieu were further exacerbated by the introduction of federal actors in the form of President Bush and FEMA Director Michael Brown, who publicly espoused their support for the hurricane and flood victims but were unable to deliver needed resources in a timely manner to reduce suffering. Following Hurricane Katrina, but during the time that victims were still being rescued from rooftops, the perceived lack of an adequate federal response by Louisiana actors resulted in public displays of frustration and critiques from the bottom up. New Orleans Mayor Nagin, frustrated by his lack of interaction with and resource support from federal officials, stated that they "don't have a clue what's going on down here" (Cable News Network 2005) . Similarly, Governor Blanco, who submitted a formal written request to FEMA for specific resources prior to Katrina making landfall, reported that she could not get the federal government to respond to her requests (Kettl 2005 Unfortunately, in a disaster context such as Hurricane Katrina, the ambiguity, confusion, and lack of intergovernmental coordination resulted in a misappropriation and underutilization of desperately needed resources that put the health and welfare of survivors in jeopardy. Several days after Katrina, essential supplies such as food and water were still not being delivered in sufficient quantities to victims remaining in New Orleans (KVOA-TV 2005) . Although the hurricane significantly damaged the region's infrastructure, evidence indicates that the problem may have been exacerbated by various "security measures" enacted to protect the unoccupied areas of New Orleans; for example, truck drivers carrying thousands of bottles of water were prevented from driving into the city because they had not been assigned a necessary "task number" by FEMA, which would allow them to pass through certain security checkpoints (Kettl 2005, 8) . Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the lack of intergovernmental coordination is the realization that the misappropriation and underutilization of strategic resources such as transportation vehicles, boats, helicopters, and first responders may have cost the lives of some citizens in the flooded areas. Five days after Hurricane Katrina, and two days after President Bush announced a massive federal rescue and relief effort, thirty-six hundred troops from the 82nd Airborne were dispatched to the Gulf Coast region to conduct search and rescue activities and to provide security, a delay that federal officials could not explain (Brown, Borenstein, and Young 2005) . As retired Army General (and former FEMA Director Julius Becton) noted, "If the First Cav and 82nd Airborne had gotten there on time, I think we would have saved some lives. . . . We recognized we had to get people out, and they had helicopters to do that" (Brown, Borenstein, and Young 2005, 1) .
In a harsh media spotlight, the preexisting historical political traditions in Louisiana caused tensions among the different levels of government, further imperiling the health, welfare, and emotional well-being of Hurricane Katrina survivors and facilitating a breakdown of intergovernmental coordination between city, parish, state, and federal actors.
Conclusions
Hurricane Katrina severely taxed the emergency management system of this country and provided insight into how it can be improved to deal with catastrophic situations in the future. These insights fall into three general categories.
Refuges and shelters. Increased attention must be paid to identifying safe refuges of last resort and emergency shelters for larger-scale disasters and catastrophes. Many of the emergency shelters established throughout the city of New Orleans ended up having to be evacuated when the levees failed. Multihazard planning must be taken into consideration when locating these shelters. Guidance needs to be developed on how to staff, provision, and manage refuges and shelters when evacuees may be in the thousands, rather than the hundreds (if that) seen in most disasters.
Temporary migration of evacuees. Katrina pointed out the need not only to prepare an area for a disaster impact but to prepare a region to accommodate the mass, albeit temporary, migration of homeless evacuees. Evacuees quickly taxed the resources of their home states, then adjacent states in the region. Some preplanning for "receptor states" to take in evacuees would lessen the confusion and uncertainty about financial consequences of large-scale disasters for nonimpacted states. The development of policies, similar to mutual aid agreements, might facilitate this process.
Enhanced intergovernmental planning and the role of FEMA. Although there has been an attempt by DHS/FEMA to standardize disaster response procedures through the adoption of the NRP and NIMS, the confusion in response to Hurricane Katrina suggests that one plan may not fit all states equally well. State and local political cultures must be taken into account when considering how these protocols should be implemented. In fact, we would argue that FEMA's regional offices should have a stronger role in working with states to adapt the NRP, NIMS, and other FEMA programs to fit local and state political systems. Perhaps if this had been done, it might not have been necessary to militarize the response in New Orleans. This recommendation, of course, could not be taken without a public discourse about the proper role of FEMA. Since the establishment of DHS, FEMA has been diminished in size, budget and authority; yet it is still the primary civilian agency tasked with all aspects of disaster management. To work with state and local governments to improve their response and recovery capabilities, we believe that enhanced intergovernmental coordination and communication are necessary; and FEMA is the sole federal entity that can currently work with other levels of government to produce this outcome.
